•  — Edited

    I was browsing some of my Seventh Day Adventist library resources today and I came across this quote that I am sharing here. Thoughts on the quote - The comment that this will happen is interjecting a futuristic understanding while neglecting the present rest that is available. Over and over in chapter 3 which starts the thought of rest says "today" Getting into chapter 4 we see the present tense used. The only time the future tense is used is when the old testament is quoted to point to the present fulfillment. I have attached a picture that highlights the present tense words in pink. Why would the author try to forward this passage to a different dispensation? Would it change an entire church if they viewed this as a present tense in which it was written? Toward the end, the author pointed to the different ways the early church dealt with the sabbath. Some would stay at home and do nothing. This behavior does not overrule the understanding that Christ is our rest/sabbath but it makes me wonder why those in the Adventist movement would promote people going to church on Saturday. So why do they? Here is the short article for those interested "Finally, I will note that the Epistle to the Hebrews begins by exhorting the believers to keep going so as to be able to enter God’s rest (4:1, 10–11). This will happen when God shakes this current world and replaces it with the hypostatic world of perpetual Sabbath celebrations (12:26–28), in which God dwells and has been enjoying a Sabbatical celebration (sabbatismos) ever since he finished the work of creation (4:9). This understanding of the Sabbath has significant affinities with the view expressed in the Epistle of Barnabas, a second-century document among the writings of the Apostolic Fathers. According to Barnabas, it is not necessary—in fact, it is impossible—to observe the Sabbath in the Present Age. Its observance will be possible in the eschatological seventh millennium after the sixth millennium of earthly life ends, according to a chiliastic allegory of the creation week (Barnabas 15:1–8). The evidence for the different ways in which early Christians viewed the Sabbath, and the disputes they caused, is impressive and worth deeper consideration.2 Those who canonize one Old Testament view of the Sabbath overlook the evidence of how Christians of the first century reflected on and disputed about the Sabbath." 2 For a more detailed analysis of the evidence, see Herold Weiss, A Day of Gladness: The Sabbath Among Jews and Christians in Antiquity (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2003). Weiss, Herold. “What the Sabbath Meant to First-Century Christians.” Adventist Today 2017 : 5. Print.
    1. perhaps you can do me a favor since I have been out to define again your exact point of contention with the trinity. So that we can dig into the one topic. It is so easy to jump into other topics and get distracted. Focusing in at one at a time would seem helpful
      1. The problem comes up: if John saw the fullness of Deity dwelling in Someone similar to the Son of Man, with respect to that Being, whose intellect, feelings and will are we talking about? as persons distinctiveness talks of maintained independence, to God's life, maybe that does not apply, maybe since they are Divine Hypostasis, their will harmonizes perfect, their feelings do not oppose, and their intellect activates with one intent... See my point, we do not know enough about what God's life is like to try to box it as person.
      2. What word do you feel fits better than person?
      3. Hypostasis (Divine), seems fine to me, but in the West some did not like it because they said it was too close to ousia. i.e. substance (hypostasis), too close to essence (ousia).
    2. Orthodox Perspectives on Person

      Technically not eastern - "The eternal and immutable God has been revealed in three co-etemal Persons. The Father is the first Person, the first hypostasis of the one God, the Son is the second Person, begotten of the only Father. The Holy Spirit is the third hypostasis, who proceeds from the Father only. (Hypostasis is a Greek word without a perfect English equivalent, usually rendered "nature," "being," or "real existence.")"


      Abune Melketsedek. The Teaching of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. N. p. Print.


      "This can be explained, for the most part, by the fact that in one and the same term some shepherds of the Church placed one meaning and others, another meaning. The concept of “essence” was expressed in the Greek language by the word ousia, and this word was in general understood by everyone in the same way. Using the word ousia, the Holy Fathers referred it to the concept of “Person.” But a lack of clarity was introduced by the use of another word, “Hypostasis.” Some signified by this term the “Persons” of the Holy Trinity, and others the “Essence.” This circumstance hindered mutual understanding. Finally, following the authoritative example of St. Basil the Great, it became accepted to understand by the word Hypostasis the Personal attributes in the Triune Divinity."



      Fr. Michael Pomazansky. Orthodox Dogmatic Theology. N. p. Print.


      "In Orthodox terminology the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are called three divine persons. Person is defined here simply as the subject of existence and life—hypostasis in the traditional church language.

         As the being, essence or nature of a reality answers the question “what?”, the person of a reality answers the question “which one?” or “who?” Thus, when we ask “What is God?” we answer that God is the divine, perfect, eternal, absolute . . . and when we ask “Who is God?” we answer that God is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

         The saints of the Church have explained this tri-unity of God by using such an example from worldly existence. We see three men. “What are they?” we ask. “They are human beings,” we answer. Each is man, possessing the same humanity and the same human nature defined in a certain way: created, temporal, physical, rational, etc. In what they are, the three men are one. But in who they are, they are three, each absolutely unique and distinct from the others. Each man in his own unique way is distinctly a man. One man is not the other, though each man is still human with one and the same human nature and form.

         Turning to God, we may ask in the same way: “What is it?” In reply we say that it is God defined as absolute perfection: “ineffable, inconceivable, invisible, incomprehensible, ever-existing, and eternally the same.” We then ask, “Who is it?”, and we answer that it is the Trinity : Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. In who God is, there are three persons who are each absolutely unique and distinct. Each is not the other, though each is still divine with the same divine nature and form. Therefore, while being one in what they are; the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are Three in who they are. And because of what and who they are—namely, uncreated, divine persons— they are undivided and perfectly united in their timeless, spaceless, sizeless, shapeless super-essential existence, as well as in their one divine life, knowledge, love, goodness, power, will, action, etc.

         Thus, according to the Orthodox Tradition, it is the mystery of God that there are Three who are divine; Three who live and act by one and the same divine perfection, yet each according to his own personal distinctness and uniqueness. Thus it is said that the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are each divine with the same divinity, yet each in his own divine way. And as the uncreated divinity has three divine subjects, so each divine action has three divine actors; there are three divine aspects to every action of God, yet the action remains one and the same.

         We discover, therefore, one God the Father Almighty with His one unique Son (Image and Word) and His one Holy Spirit. There is one living God with His one perfect divine Life, who is personally the Son, with His one Spirit of Life. There is one True God with His one divine Truth, who is personally the Son, with His one Spirit of Truth. There is one wise and loving God with His one Wisdom and Love, who is personally the Son, with His one Spirit of Wisdom and Love. The examples could go on indefinitely: the one divine Father personifying every aspect of His divinity in His one divine Son, who is personally activated by His one divine Spirit. We will see the living implications of the Trinity as we survey the activity of God in his actions toward man and the world"



      Thomas Hopko. The Orthodox Faith Doctrine and Scripture. Vol. 1. N. p. Print.


      "The noun “hypostasis” and the adjective “hypostatic” are used to describe the substantive existence or subsistent entity of each of the three persons or individuals of the Holy Trinity (A Patristic Greek Lexicon, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 1456). St. John of Damaskos says, “We believe in one God, one origin without beginning, uncreated, unchanging, immortal, eternal, infinite, indescribable, omnipotent, simple, bodiless, invisible, the source of goodness and righteousness … the cause of all good things, one essence, one divinity, one power, one desire, one action, one beginning, one authority, one strength, one kingdom, recognized and worshipped in three perfect hypostases … which is indeed inexplicable … There is truly one God: God [the Father] and the Logos [the Son] and His Spirit” (Ἔκδοσις Ἀκριβὴς τῆς Ὀρθοδόξου Πίστεως {An Exact Exposition on the Orthodox Faith}, Thessaloniki: Pournara, 1998, pp. 47-49 & 62). The holy Fathers teach that several verses in the Old Testament declare the existence of the Holy Trinity. Such examples are, “Let Us make man in Our image, according to Our likeness” (Gen. 1:26). “Behold, the man has become like one of Us” (Gen. 3:22). “Come, let Us go down and confuse their language” (Gen. 11:7). “The Lord rained brimstone and fire on Sodom … from the Lord” (Gen. 19:24)."


      Elder Ephraim, The Art of Salvation, Saint Nektarios Monastery Publications 2014 p. Print.


      "According to Zizioulas, it was the Greek fathers, especially the Cappadocians, whose efforts to formulate trinitarian theology laid the groundwork for an ontology of person. They effected what amounts to a “revolution” within monistic Greek philosophical thinking by identifying “hypostasis” (ὑπόστασις, substantia) with “person” (πρόσωπον, persona), that is, with a concept to which no ontological content could be attributed within the framework of this particular thinking.19 This identification entailed two weighty consequences:

      (a) The person is no longer an adjunct to a being, a category we add to a concrete entity once we have first verified its ontological hypostasis. It is itself the hypostasis of the being. (b) Entities no longer trace their being to being itself—that is, being is not an absolute category in itself—but to the person, to precisely that which constitutes being, that is, enables entities to be entities.20

      In what follows, I will examine more closely these two consequences of the patristic theological and philosophical revolution, consequences which together constitute the two cornerstones of the ontology of person represented by Zizioulas.

      If one understands the trinitarian postulate μία οὐσία, τρία πρόσωπα (“one substance, three persons”) to mean that God at first (in the ontological sense) is the one God, and only then exists as three persons, then “the ontological principle” of the deity is lodged at the level of substance, and one still remains entangled in monistic ontology. The trinitarian identification of “hypostasis” and “person” effected by the Cappadocians breaks through this ontology. This identification asserts that God’s being coincides with God’s personhood. This is precisely the sense of the statement that God the Father is not only the πηγή (“source”), but also the personal αἰτία (“cause”) of the Son and Spirit.21 The being of the triune God is a result of God’s personal freedom. “God does not exist because He cannot but exist”;22 quite the contrary: God the Father perpetually confirms—constitutes!—his own existence in the free personal activity of the divine life.23"


      19 See Zizioulas, Communion, 36f.

      20 Ibid., 39.

      21 See Zizioulas, “Holy Spirit,” 37.

      22 Zizioulas, Communion, 18.

      23 “God, as Father and not as substance, perpetually confirms through ‘being’ His free will to exist” (Zizioulas, Communion, 41).


       Volf, Miroslav. After Our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity. Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge, U.K.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1998. Print. Sacra Doctrina: Christian Theology for a Postmodern Age.


      1. "EUTYCHIANISM Eutychianism takes its name from the fifth-century monastic leader, Eutyches, who maintained that divinity and humanity merge to form one nature in the incarnate Christ. The position arose in reaction to Nestorianism, the view that there are two persons in Christ: the divine Son and the man, Jesus. The Council of Ephesus (431) rejected Nestorianism by affirming the unity of Christ’s person, but Eutyches and his followers went further by denying any distinction between Christ’s two natures. As such, Eutychianism is a form of monophysitism—the view that Christ has only one nature. The Council of Chalcedon (451) strongly rejected Eutychianism by asserting the distinction of Christ’s two natures “without confusion [and] without change.” The great danger of Eutychianism is that it confuses the two natures of Christ, making him a kind of tertium quid (“third thing”), which is neither God nor man. On the divine side of the ledger, it posits a change in the Son’s divinity, which calls into question his immutability and thus his unity with the Father and the Spirit. On the human side, Eutychianism, like all monophysite Christologies, tends to elevate Christ’s divinity to the point of diminishing his humanity. If there is to be a fusion of natures, then quite clearly it will be the divine nature that takes precedence over and overwhelms the creaturely nature. The result of this belittling of Christ’s humanity is a belittling of his saving work as the Last Adam—the True Man—who renders willing obedience to God in and through our common humanity, thus securing righteousness and eternal life for his people" https://ref.ly/o/credo06-2/10760?length=1633 "The Eutychians were led to the opposite extreme from the Nestorians. They held that there were not two natures but only one nature in Christ. All of Christ was divine, even his body. The divine and the human in Christ were mingled into one, which constituted a third nature. The Eutychians were often called Monophysites because they virtually reduced the two natures of Christ to one. The Council of Chalcedon, in 451, condemned this doctrine. The Monophysite controversy then took a new turn. Some followers of this view now taught that Christ had but one will. But the Third Council of Constantinople, in 681, condemned the Monothelite doctrine, declaring that in Christ there are two distinct natures, a human and a divine, and that therefore there are of necessity two intelligences and two wills. G. The Orthodox View The Council of Chalcedon, in 451, established what has been the position of the Christian church. There is one Jesus Christ, but he has two natures, the human and the divine. He is truly God and truly man, composed of body and rational soul. He is consubstantial with the Father in his deity and consubstantial with man in his humanity, except for sin. In his deity he was begotten of the Father before time, and in his humanity born of the virgin Mary. The distinction between the natures is not diminished by their union, but the specific character of each nature is preserved and they are united in one person. Jesus is not split or divided into two persons; he is one person, the Son of God" https://ref.ly/o/thiessensystheo/513515?length=1518 "If the divine and human natures are joined in the one person of Christ, it becomes crucial to say precisely how the natures are joined, or at least to rule out wrong answers to that question. An error called Eutychianism conceived of the two natures as merging or mingling together in the incarnation, so that divinity and humanity flowed into Christ to form an unprecedented, new, mixed nature: a divine-and-human nature. In visual terms, you could say that if divinity is yellow and humanity is blue, Eutychianism makes Christ green. Many theological problems arise from this error, but the most disastrous is that the humanity of Christ is eclipsed. Recall that the two natures involved in the incarnation are not the same size: divinity is infinite, but humanity is not. So if the two natures were to flow into one common nature, the result would not be a compound Christ, but a disappearance of the human into the divine. Again the logic of salvation would be undercut, as God would not so much save humanity as eliminate it by overwhelming it. The council of Chalcedon (held in what is now a province of Istanbul) was not convened only to refute Eutychianism, but also to draw together the abiding insights of Cyril (one person), the clarity of Pope Leo I, and to summarize the conciliar Christology so far. With Chalcedon, Christology achieves a remarkable balance. If Nestorianism exaggerated what is double in Christ, Eutychianism exaggerated what is single in Christ. The incarnate Son is one person in two natures; not two persons (Nestorianism) or one nature (Eutychianism). In the incarnation, rightly understood, divinity and humanity are both truly present, neither diverging nor merging. In these four councils, the early church faced the hardest questions and rejected the major mistakes that can be made in answering them. The central section of the Chalcedonian Definition of 451 sums up the results: “He was begotten before the ages from the Father as regards his divinity, and in the last days the same for us and for our salvation from Mary, the virgin God-bearer, as regards his humanity; one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, only-begotten, acknowledged in two natures which undergo no confusion, no change, no division, no separation.” Those four mighty negatives are boundary markers for orthodoxy, showing the right way to interpret the Bible in light of the logic of salvation. Later Councils There were several councils after Chalcedon worth paying attention to, but the most important was a second Council of Constantinople held in 553 under Emperor Justinian. Its importance lies in the fact that it connected Trinitarian and Christological terminology. There are three persons in the Trinity, and one of those three persons is the Son, the subject of the incarnation. The second person of the Trinity, in other words, is the one person of the incarnation. One of the Trinity died on the cross. The Christology of Chalcedon describes the incarnation as a hypostatic union, where “hypostatic” means “in a person.” The incarnation is not a union of natures (that would be Eutychianism) nor an interpersonal union (that would be Nestorianism), but a personal union: two natures maintaining their own natural reality and integrity, but now united in one person or hypostasis. After Chalcedon, it was possible to integrate this truth with the truth of the Trinity, in which we confess one divine nature in three hypostases or persons. The result is a beautiful integration of the biblical storyline with the more analytic categories of doctrinal clarity. The person of the Son came down and became incarnate, adding a true human nature to his eternal divine nature. There was nothing novel in this. The fifth council simply brought together Christological and Trinitarian uses of the word “person” in order to make it clear that the person on the cross is the Son of God. It may be helpful to simplify the Christology of the councils as a way of keeping good order between the unity and the duality of Christ. Chalcedonian categories are especially helpful in maintaining the integrity of the two natures, maintaining a duality in Christ. Anything that belongs to a nature is something that we should expect to be dually present in the incarnation: two natures, two sets of natural inclinations, and even two natural wills, as a later council (Constantinople III in 681) would affirm. But anything belonging to a person is something that we should expect to be singly present in the incarnation. An important consequence of this is that when we say “Jesus is a human person,” we do not mean that his personhood is something creaturely like the personhood of every other human. Instead, we mean that he is a divine person (the Son of God, the second person of the Trinity) who has taken on a created human nature. At the center of the incarnation is the hypostasis of the hypostatic union. The person involved in the incarnation is not a compound person derived by adding something from above and something from below; the person of the Son comes down from above and takes to himself what is below. The parallelism and duality appropriate to two-natures Christology only functions properly within a zone marked out by the doctrine of the Trinity. Thus the clear categories of Chalcedon, with their tough logic articulating how the divine and human natures of Christ do and do not relate in his one person, are given life and sense by the doctrine of the Trinity, the story arc of Christ’s mission to save humanity, and the logic of salvation. We may have any number of further questions about the incarnation, and we should be alert to which ones will not be answerable. Questions about the interior psychological experience of the incarnate Son of God, for instance, are probably not questions we can answer. But the point of the Christological work of the councils was not to dissolve the mystery of the incarnation; it was to locate that mystery and to exclude false understandings of it. In some of the councils, the books of the Gospels were set up on prominent display to show that Scripture itself was the source and the goal of all the deliberations. For those of us who inherit the conciliar Christology today, it continues to be true that the doctrines should serve the Bible, and not vice versa. The decisions of the councils should serve to help us understand the story of Jesus in Scripture" https://ref.ly/o/csbancientfaithsb/44260?length=6426
      2. Interesting Blair. I looked quickly over it, and the point stands: Jesus was less than the Father only when voluntarily let go of divinity to become incarnate Hypostasis of God, so He could die for us. Like I mentioned elsewhere, He is indwelled by the Father first as the Angel of Yahweh, (the Spirit of God was in that Angel), then as incarnated Being, the Holy Spirit indwelled Him, so He could be a vessel for the performance of the miracle works. Finally when glorified Jesus becomes the New Temple of God, where the fullness of Deity dwells bodily. Jesus was fully divine on Earth (ie with miracle powers when the Holy Spirit was on Him). It seems that the H.S. needed to go away for Him to die. Note that the Bible that Jesus was similar to His brothers, an nowhere does it say that of a fallen nature, so there is a great chance that He was of Adam's human nature before the fall. The problem of the Doctrines now is that they think beings from a fallen nature are the rule, when that is the exception. God's Kingdom must be humongous, we are but a little region of it. We are not the rule, in God's Kingdom there is only one will: His, an no suffering, injustice, calamities, etc. Perfect Jesus (most likely in Adam's pre fall nature) came to save us fallen creatures, as we are the ones out of whack. So anyone thinking Jesus is of a fallen nature is probably eisegesing the Bible. The Holy Spirit does not remain in fallen nature after comes down. Not sure if you have the resource that talks a bit about Jesus the New Temple of God. I will post in private message to you.
      3. I am in the process of responding to those other points on the other thread that it was under. Hope to be done with the response tonight. God willing of course :) Hope you have had a blessed resurrection day so far.
    3. Stewart H. F. and Rand E. K. “Introduction.” Boethius: The Theological Tractates and the Consolation of Philosophy


      "Wherefore if Person belongs to substances alone, and these rational, and if every nature is a substance, existing not in universals but in individuals, we have found the definition of Person, viz.: “The individual substance of a rational nature.”a Now by this definition we Latins have described what the Greeks call ὑπόστασις. For the word person seems to be borrowed from a different source, namely from the masks which in comedies and tragedies used to signify the different subjects of representation. Now persona “mask” is derived from personare, with a circumflex on the penultimate. But if the accent is put on the antepenultimatea the word will clearly be seen to come from sonus “sound,” and for this reason, that the hollow mask necessarily produces a larger sound. The Greeks, too, call these masks πρόσωπα from the fact that they are placed over the face and conceal the countenance from the spectator: παρὰ τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς ὦπας τίθεσθαι. But since, as we have said, it was by the masks they put on that actors played the different characters represented in a tragedy or comedy—Hecuba or Medea or Simon or Chremes,—so also all other men who could be recognized by their several characteristics were designated by the Latins with the term persona and by the Greeks with πρόσωπα. But the Greeks far more clearly gave to the individual subsistence of a rational nature the name ὑπόστασις, while we through want of appropriate words have kept a borrowed term, calling that persona which they call ὑπόστασις; but Greece with its richer vocabulary gives the name ὑπόστασις to the individual subsistence. And, if I may use Greek in dealing with matters which were first mooted by Greeks before they came to be interpreted in Latin: αἱ οὐσίαι ἐν μὲν τοῖς καθόλου εἶναι δύνανται· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀτόμοις καὶ κατὰ μέρος μόνοις ὑφίστανται, that is: essences indeed can have potential existence in universals, but they have particular substantial existence in particulars alone. For it is from particulars that all our comprehension of universals is taken. Wherefore since subsistences are present in universals but acquire substance in particulars they rightly gave the name ὑπόστασις to subsistences which acquired substance through the medium of particulars. For to no one using his eyes with any care or penetration will subsistence and substance appear identical.

      For our equivalents of the Greek terms οὐσίωσις οὐσιῶσθαι are respectively subsistentia and subsistere, while their ὑπόστασις ὑφίστασθαι are represented by our substantia and substare. For a thing has subsistence when it does not require accidents in order to be, but that thing has substance which supplies to other things, accidents to wit, a substrate enabling them to be; for it “substands” those things so long as it is subjected to accidents. Thus genera and species have only subsistence, for accidents do not attach to genera and species. But particulars have not only subsistence but substance, for they, no more than generals, depend on accidents for their Being; for they are already provided with their proper and specific differences and they enable accidents to be by supplying them with a substrate. Wherefore esse and subsistere represent εἶναι and οὐσιῶσθαι, while substare represents ὑφίστασθαι. For Greece is not, as Marcus Tulliusa playfully says, short of words, but provides exact equivalents for essentia, subsistentia, substantia and persona—οὐσία for essentia, οὐσίωσις for subsistentia, ὑπόστασις for substantia, πρόσωπον for persona. But the Greeks called individual substances ὑποστάσεις because they underlie the rest and offer support and substrate to what are called accidents; and we in our term call them substances as being substrate—ὑποστάσεις, and since they also term the same substances πρόσωπα, we too may call them persons. So οὐσία is identical with essence, οὐσίωσις with subsistence, ὑπόστασις with substance, πρόσωπον with person. But the reason why the Greek does not use ὑπόστασις of irrational animals while we apply the term substance to them is this: This term was applied to things of higher value, in order that what is more excellent might be distinguished, if not by a definition of nature answering to the literal meaning of ὑφίστασθαι = substare, at any rate by the words ὑπόστασις = substantia.

      To begin with, then, man is essence, i.e. οὐσία, subsistence, i.e. οὐσίωσις, ὑπόστασις, i.e. substance, πρόσωπον, i.e. person: οὐσία or essentia because he is, οὐσίωσις or subsistence because he is not accidental to any subject, ὑπόστασις or substance because he is subject to all the things which are not subsistences or οὐσιώσεις, while he is πρόσωπον or person because he is a rational individual. Next, God is οὐσία or essence, for He is and is especially that from which proceeds the Being of all things. To Him belong οὐσιωσις, i.e. subsistence, for He subsists in absolute independence, and ὑφίστασθαι, for He is substantial Being. Whence we go on to say that there is one οὐσία or οὐσίωσις, i.e. one essence or subsistence of the Godhead, but three ὑποστάσεις or substances. And indeed, following this use, men have spoken of One essence, three substances and three persons of the Godhead. For did not the language of the Church forbid us to say three substances in speaking of God,a substance might seem a right term to apply to Him, not because He underlies all other things like a substrate, but because, just as He excels above all things, so He is the foundation and support of things, supplying them all with οὐσιῶσθαι or subsistence."



      Stewart H. F. and Rand E. K. “Introduction.” Boethius: The Theological Tractates and the Consolation of Philosophy. Trans. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand. Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann, 1918. 85–91. Print.

      1. Statement "Before that, Jesus had no supernatural ministry" Response: There is so much that is unknown that one would be hard-pressed to prove such a statement. Certainly the miracles were given as a proof of who He is. Statement: "When Jesus says the Father indwells me, is creates an apparent paradox, because the Hypostasis that came down and indwelled Him was the Holy Spirit." Response: Indwelled by the Father is not the understanding I understood from the Jesus saying if you have seen me you have seen the Father. "For there is no need, to persons of intelligence, to attempt to prove, from the deeds of Christ subsequent to His baptism, that His soul and His body, His human nature9 like ours, were real, and no phantom of the imagination. For the deeds done by Christ after His baptism, and especially His miracles, gave indication and assurance to the world of the Deity hidden in His flesh. For, being at once both God and perfect man likewise, He gave us sure indications of His two natures:10 of His Deity, by His miracles during the three years that elapsed after His baptism; of His humanity, during the thirty similar periods which preceded His baptism, in which, by reason of His low estate11 as regards the flesh, He concealed the signs of His Deity, although He was the true God existing before all ages." 9 Or, according to Migne’s punctuation, “His soul, and the body of His human nature.” The words are, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ἀφάνταστον τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ σώματος τῆς καθʼ ἡμᾶς ἀνθρωπινῆς φύσεως. 10 Οὐσίας. [Comp. note 13, infra.] 11 Τὸ ἀτέλες. Roberts, Alexander, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe, eds. “Remains of the Second and Third Centuries: Melito, the Philosopher.” The Ante-Nicene Fathers: Fathers of the Third and Fourth Centuries: The Twelve Patriarchs, Excerpts and Epistles, the Clementina, Apocrypha, Decretals, Memoirs of Edessa and Syriac Documents, Remains of the First Ages. Trans. B. P. Pratten. Vol. 8. Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Company, 1886. 760. Print. "Their request to be shown the Father is somewhat disheartening to Jesus. Has He been so long a time with them all (the first you of v. 9 is plural), showing them all the miracles from the Father, and still Philip (this second you is singular) has not known Him? The one who has seen Jesus has also thereby seen the Father—how can an apostle, of all people (this last you of v. 9 is emphatic), say, “Show us the Father”? Obviously Jesus is in the Father and the Father in Him. The two are one (10:30), in that Jesus is the perfect expression of the Father’s nature (John 1:18; Heb. 1:3" Farley, Lawrence R. The Gospel of John: Beholding the Glory. Chesterton, IN: Ancient Faith Publishing, 2006. Print. The Orthodox Bible Study Companion. Statement: "When Jesus is glorified, then becoming the New Temple of God, the fullness of Deity dwells in Him bodily" Response: I know you have made this new temple of God argument here before but you will need to explain it a bit further. The fullness of deity does dwell in Jesus but for trinitarians that is our argument for the trinity. There is no exact phrase in the new testament that is stated like that. But perhaps I am wrong. According to the New Testament there are many temples of God because believers are temples of God Statement: "There were no 2 persons, but 2 combined Hypostasis, to have a Being that could relate to us personally without probably killing us if showed up in Spirit form" Response: We again speak about a combining or mixing but that is not my understanding from the text. The passage you quote from Revelation speaks of a glorified Messiah, Jesus. Is there something in the Greek of the passage that you are pointing to in order to make the combined / mixed argument? Statement "2 Divine Hypostasis could easily do the mixing. Persons am I not so sure." Response: I am not sure I am convinced of your definition of hypostasis. It seems contrary to what I have read thus far. Though I did find this article to be helpful to further my education on the matter today "Hypostasis A Greek word, the meaning of which depends largely on its context, although in the later Fathers it became almost equivalent to “being.” In Heb. 11:1 faith as the hupostasis of things hoped for (elpizomenōn) may mean “realization” (BDAG 1040), but it may also mean “foundation” or “basis” (Grimm-Th 643). For its use in patristic thought, Lampe devotes fifteen columns to its meaning (Lampe 1454–61). It may denote “origination” (Hippolytus; Gregory of Nyssa); in Heb. 11:1, Irenaeus and Chrysostom insist that it may denote “ground of confidence”; in the Cappadocian Fathers and others it may also denote “having substantive existence”; in Heb. 1:3 it is “variously interpreted” (1457). Many of the Church Fathers use hypostasis as the equivalent of ousia, “substance” or “being” (1458). Lampe cites references in Origen, Cyril of Jerusalem, and many others, to this effect. In Christology it was used prior to Chalcedon to denote “state of being” (Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, and others; 1458–59). After Chalcedon it could even sometimes approximate to the modern notion of person (1461). In the fifth century and earlier, it comes to be contrasted with ousia, “being,” to mean individual reality, especially in a Trinitarian context. The formula “three hypostaseis in one ousia” came to be widely accepted. Thus it becomes crucial to identify not only the context of discussion, but also its date. Since the rise in modern times of linguistic philosophy, Gilbert Ryle and others have warned against “hypostatizing an abstraction,” that is, rendering a concept as a thing or a reality." Thiselton, Anthony C. “Hypostasis.” The Thiselton Companion to Christian Theology 2015 : 473. Print.
      2.  — Edited

        statement: There is so much that is unknown that one would be hard-pressed to prove such a statement. Certainly the miracles were given as a proof of who He is. response: Jesus ministry of signs and wonders started after His baptism, when the Holy Spirit came down on Him and remained. He then told Religious authorities that such wonders were done by the finger of God, not by Him. That is in accordance with Philippians: I have no original language abilities, but work with translations and try to understand the theological implications of what is written there. Leb: Php 2:5  Think this in yourselves which was also in Christ Jesus, Php 2:6  who, existing in the form of God, did not consider being equal with God something to be grasped, Php 2:7  but emptied himself by taking the form of a slave, bybecoming in the likeness of people. And being found in appearance like a man, Before incarnation, Jesus was equal to God and was none other than the Angel of Yahweh (not according to me, but more knowledgeable persons that study this and I agree). The reasons they give is that as soon as Jesus incarnated, the Angel of Yahweh disappeared from the scene. If Jesus emptied Himself (of the presence of God in the form of the Holy Spirit) then He had no power to do those signs and wonders, until God Himself send the Holy Spirit down (His presence) on Jesus, the Word incarnated for a specific mission. He became in the likeness (not equal, since He was not in the fallen nature), but most probably in a nature similar to Adam In pre fall condition so that He could have equality of testing conditions. I explain why I think that in other post, but I will repeat it: The Holy Spirit could not come down, indwell and "remain" on any person of fallen nature, because the atonement had not happened to have that person justified, and if that had not happened the death sentence was in effect. statement: Indwelled by the Father is not the understanding I understood from the Jesus saying if you have seen me you have seen the Father. Joh 14:10  Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me? The words that I say to you I do not speak from myself, but the Father residing in me does his works. (ESV)  Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me? The words that I say to you I do not speak on my own authority, but the Father who dwells in me does his works. Not need to be an original language expert to see that Jesus refers to the Father coexisting with Him In His body... residing, dwells in me... When did that happen? the only time someone came down so that we can see the presence of God was in Jesus (incarnated) was when the Holy Spirit came down, and unlike any other person ever up to that time, the Holy Spirit remained.. Leb: Joh 1:29  On the next day he saw Jesus coming to him and said, "Look! The Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world! Joh 1:30  This one is the one about whom I said, 'After me is coming a man who is ahead of me, because he existed before me.' Joh 1:31  And I did not know him, but in order that he could be revealed to Israel, because of this I came baptizing with water." Joh 1:32  And John testified, saying, "I have seen the Spirit descending like a dove from heaven and remaining upon him. John the Baptists says Jesus existed before him, even though Jesus was born after him. (preexistence maybe?) Never had the Holy Spirit remained upon a fallen creation person, because there was death sentence, it could only happen after the atonement, or on Jesus: a Divine Hypostasis allowed to have life in Himself and similar to His fallen brothers but maybe in Adam's pre fall nature, to have equality of testing condition. Same reason why Mary's ovum was most probably not used for the placement of the Jesus' zygote in the womb, because fallen nature could not receive the Holy Spirit and remain until after the atonement. quote: "He concealed the signs of His Deity, although He was the true God existing before all ages." Philippians says that Jesus voluntarily let go of Deity to come down: Leb: Php 2:7  but emptied himself by taking the form of a slave, bybecoming in the likeness of people. And being found in appearance like a man, Php 2:8  he humbled himself by becoming obedient to the point of death, that is, death on a cross. So in order to do miraculous deeds, He needed the presence of God, that came down as the Holy Spirit, and remained on Him, basically it seems to just before Jesus' death. At that point the Holy Spirit that came down and remained, probably left (and had Jesus say: why have you forsaken me God [paraphrase]. The probable reason is that if the Holy Spirit (able to keep alive, resuscitate, etc) was to stay, then Jesus would not be able to die. And Jesus died, because He let go of Divinity so that He could die for us as a incarnated Hypostasis, not as God Himself that He had always been (as Angel of Yahweh), or was going to be (as the New Temple of God where the fullness of Deity dwells bodily). So the only time Jesus was less that the Father was in incarnation, having willfully accepted to come similar to His fallen brothers. quote: "The two are one (10:30), in that Jesus is the perfect expression of the Father’s nature (John 1:18; Heb. 1:3" I talked about this before but will repeat: When you look at yourself in a mirror, there is an image reflected. is real and acts on your visual perceptual channel, you can see it, but it does not have life. Your image is a hypostasis of you, but without life. is a substantive reality but lifeless. Jesus is the image of God (a Substantive Reality) but allowed to have life in Himself... Leb: Joh 5:26  For just as the Father has life in himself, thus also he has granted to the Son to have life in himself. So that image (Hypostasis) could incarnate without Divinity so He could die for us. Just for that very particular historical event, the attribute of being immortal was not there, like Philippians pericope explains. Once the atonement was done, then resuscitated Jesu become the New Temple of God where the fullness of Deity dwells bodily... A different version of the Angel of Yahweh, now fully prepared to be the High Priest forever because He can emphasize with us due to the experience of Incarnation. So of course Jesus will be the image of the Father's nature, because He is a Substantive reality allowed to have life in Himself, (an image of the invisible God). Statement: I know you have made this new temple of God argument here before but you will need to explain it a bit further. The fullness of deity does dwell in Jesus but for trinitarians that is our argument for the trinity. There is no exact phrase in the new testament that is stated like that. But perhaps I am wrong. According to the New Testament there are many temples of God because believers are temples of God I explained that in another post: https://faithlife.com/posts/2954243 And this is the beauty of it: an unfallen human, dying voluntarily for the fallen ones... Wisdom and Power of God at best, so that obedience was learned by making Himself similar to us, and letting go of being same as God, so that He could die for us. To then be glorified and have the fullness of Deity dwell bodily being the New Temple of God. By extension, as we are the body of Christ, we become living stones, part of that Temple, but that does not make us same as the Spirit that indwells the temple. Being a living stone part of the New Temple of God, does not give us self-existence. That is an incommunicable attribute of God. We will always be dependent on God's grace to continue living even in glorified form. statement: I am not sure I am convinced of your definition of hypostasis. It seems contrary to what I have read thus far. Though I did find this article to be helpful to further my education on the matter today To keep it simple: Jews were before the carriers of the oracles of God. Their theological center was: (ESV)  Deut 6:4 “Hear, O Israel: The LORD our God, the LORD is one. God's prophets knew and prophesied accordingly: Leb: Isa 9:6  For a child has been born for us; a son has been given to us. And the dominion will be on his shoulder, and his name is called Wonderful Counselor, Mighty God, Everlasting Father, Prince of Peace. Note at end characteristics of different Hypostasis in one Being. Zec 14:9  And Yahweh will be king over all the earth; on that day Yahweh will be one and his name one. Then the loved Apostle of Jesus, John saw the fulfillment of such in Patmos: Revelation 1:12-19, as he himself says, it was someone like the son of man, not exactly him. I have gone over this in other posts. Jesus did not have white hair, the Ancient of Days did, Jesus was not usually associated with the first and last title, that was usually of Yahweh, etc. So this one "person" John saw, was none other than the New Temple of God (Jesus) with the fullness of Deity dwelling there bodily (the Father). Two Divine Hypostasis together, like it was the Spirit of God in the Angel of Yahweh, like it was Jesus with the Spirit of God dwelling Him, and is at the end like categorically said by God Himself in Deut 6:4. Most likely all three Hypostasis there, but only one Being seen. I think I have tried to make myself crystal clear, and only with the intention of further research, reflection and comment for enrichment of the true sheep. All have the right to disagree, but so far what I have gleaned and learned mostly from giants on which their shoulders I have tried to stand, is the construct that seems to me comes closer to complying with the standard for validation of the model as shown in the attached media in this thread. I do want to thank you for your excellent research skills, from which we gained some insight as to how, where and why to look, and thanking very much the time you have taken to check it all. Feel free to continue in this amazing search for truth, that shows that rational and in civility dialogue is possible. I tried to search for different related terms in a collection containing Temple term, but the list is long and have not been able to check all. I am pleasantly surprised with the improved searching, in which factbook entries are suggested right out, but see some key terms missing (like person) in the Lexham Theological Wordbook, etc. I wish that FL made available the collection for the highest denominational packages, so that one could easily check all the collection for terms in that particular denomination. Long post, but done with g:agape for the true sheep that may benefit from it, giving good ideas for further research, reflection and exchange.
      3. Statement: "Jesus ministry of signs and wonders started after His baptism, when the Holy Spirit came down on Him and remained." Response: Agreed the "ministry of signs and wonders". My point was we do not know much of His life before His ministry took place. We cannot say whether or not He performed miracles prior based on the scripture alone Statement: "Before incarnation, Jesus was equal to God and was none other than the Angel of Yahweh (not according to me, but more knowledgeable persons that study this and I agree)." Response: This is definitely a passage that needs to be carefully parsed. One Orthodox teachers notes "In describing Christ’s voluntary “descent,” St. Paul first describes Him as having existed [Gr. uparcho] in the form of God. The word translated existed is a stronger verb than the verb “to be.” It indicates a continued, nontentative, unchanging form of subsisting. Christ existed in the form of God—that is, stable and sovereign, having all the attributes and characteristics of Deity, being one with the Father. Nonetheless, He did not esteem that having His being in a manner equal with God was a thing to be seized. He did not clutch it like a precious treasure, refusing to let it go. On the contrary, He emptied Himself by taking the form of a slave. In His love for us, He willingly exchanged the position and privilege of the highest for the position and humiliation of the lowest. His form (or essential character and mode of existence, Gr. morphe) went from that of the Deity to that of the servant; from being adored by myriads of angels and archangels to being the Carpenter of Nazareth who had no place to lay His head. Without ceasing to be divine, He assumed humanity also for our sake. Through His Birth from the all-holy Theotokos, He became in the likeness [Gr. omoioma] of men, being found in appearance (Gr. schema) as a man. The terms translated likeness and appearance do not deny the reality of the Incarnation. They do not mean that He was simply “like” a man, that He only “appeared” to be human, but was not human in reality. Rather, they mean that Christ was like all men everywhere, no different from them at all, sharing their full human nature. His appearance (or outward manifestation, manner of being, deportment) was that of a human being. He lived in the world as a true Man among men, able now to look up as well as down." Farley, Lawrence R. The Prison Epistles: Philippians, Ephesians, Colossians, Philemon. Chesterton, IN: Ancient Faith Publishing, 2003. Print. The Orthodox Bible Study Companion. The Orthodox Study Bible notes this "2:6 The form (Gr. morphe) of God, a concept parallel with “the image [Gr. eikon] of God” (Col 1:15), refers to the Son’s sharing in full the divine nature. Robbery (Gr. harpagmon, lit. “prize” or “booty”) refers to an object stolen and tightly clutched. Christ has equality with God not by seizure but by nature, and with absolute security. There is, therefore, no threat, loss, or any change in the divine nature of the Son of God when He takes our humanity to Himself and offers us salvation. 2:7, 8 Made Himself of no reputation (v. 7; lit. “emptied Himself”) deals with the Son’s will, not His nature. He emptied Himself not by laying down His divine nature or setting it aside, but by voluntarily taking on our human nature. To human beings He looks just like another human being, for being truly incarnate, He is fully man by nature. He took the form of a bondservant, voluntarily sharing our human condition except for one thing: sin. In His humanity, He showed the fullness of humility by His obedience to the death that has enslaved humanity. To die on a cross, the death of a criminal, was repulsive to the Romans and considered a curse by the Jews. But His death brings life to all who are joined to Him." Sparks, Jack Norman. The Orthodox Study Bible: Notes. Thomas Nelson, 2008. Print. Ancient Faith Study Bible had an interesting quote from Augustine "AUGUSTINE: Wherein lies the Son’s equality? If you say in greatness, there is no equality of greatness in one who is less eternal. And so with other things. Is he perhaps equal in might but not equal in wisdom? Yet how can there be equality of might in one who is inferior in wisdom? Or is he equal in wisdom but not equal in might? But how can there be equality of virtue in one who is inferior in power? Instead Scripture declares more simply “he thought it not robbery to be equal.” Therefore every adversary of truth who is at all subject to apostolic authority must admit that the Son is in some one respect at least the equal of God. Let him choose whichever quality he might wish, but from that it will appear that he is equal in all that is attributed to divinity. ON THE TRINITY 6.5." Bell, James Stuart, ed. Ancient Faith Study Bible. Nashville, TN: Holman Bibles, 2019. Print. Based on my readings I guess I need further proof that Jesus was no longer equal to God. If He was not equal certainly He could not be called God in the flesh, or God with us as other scriptures note. Statement: " If Jesus emptied Himself (of the presence of God in the form of the Holy Spirit) then He had no power to do those signs and wonders, until God Himself send the Holy Spirit down (His presence) on Jesus, the Word incarnated for a specific mission. He became in the likeness (not equal, since He was not in the fallen nature), but most probably in a nature similar to Adam In pre fall condition so that He could have equality of testing conditions." Response: It is my understanding that the Holy Spirit is not a form but a person. Not the same person as Yeshua because Yeshua sends the Spirit. It is an assumption that Jesus had no power to do signs and wonders. That is not stated by a text of the bible but is read into "eisegesis" the passage in question. With regard to this passage I also read this from Golden Mouth which would seem to note the Orthodox Patristic understanding "Arius confesses indeed the Son, but only in word; he says that He is a creature, and much inferior to the Father. And others say that He has not a soul. Seest thou the chariots standing? See then their fall, how he overthrows them all together, and with a single stroke. How? “Have the same mind in you,” he says, “which was in Christ Jesus, who being in the form of God, counted it not a prize to be on an equality with God.” And Paul6 of Samosata has fallen, and Marcellus, and Sabellius. For he says, “Being in the form of God.” If “in the form” how sayest thou, O wicked one, that He took His origin from Mary, and was not before? and how dost thou say that He was an energy? For it is written, “The form of God took the form of a servant.” “The form of a servant,” is it the energy of a servant, or the nature of a servant? By all means, I fancy, the nature of a servant. Thus too the form of God, is the nature of God, and therefore not an energy. Behold also Marcellus of Galatia, Sophronius and Photinus have fallen. Behold Sabellius too. It is written, “He counted it not a prize to be on an equality with God.” Now equality is not predicated, where there is but one person, for that which is equal hath somewhat to which it is equal. Seest thou not the substance of two Persons, and not empty names without things? Hearest thou not the eternal pre-existence of the Only-begotten? Lastly, What shall we say against Arius,7 who asserts the Son is of a different substance? Tell me now, what means, “He took the form of a servant”? It means, He became man. Wherefore “being in the form of God,” He was God. For one “form” and another “form” is named; if the one be true, the other is also. “The form of a servant” means, Man by nature, wherefore “the form of God” means, God by nature. And he not only bears record of this, but of His equality too, as John also doth, that he is no way inferior to the Father, for he saith, “He thought it not a thing to seize,8 to be equal with God.” Now what is their wise reasoning? Nay, say they, he proves the very contrary; for he says, that, “being in the form of God, He seized not equality with God.” How if He were God, how was He able “to seize upon it”? and is not this without meaning? Who would say that one, being a man, seized not on being a man? for how would any one seize on that which he is? No, say they, but he means that being a little God, He seized not upon being equal to the great God, Who was greater than He. Is there a great and a little God? And do ye bring in the doctrines of the Greeks upon those of the Church? With them there is a great and a little God. If it be so with you, I know not. For you will find it nowhere in the Scriptures: there you will find a great God throughout, a little one nowhere. If He were little, how would he also be God? If man is not little and great, but one nature, and if that which is not of this one nature is not man, how can there be a little God and a great one? He who is not of that nature is not God. For He is everywhere called great in Scripture; “Great is the Lord, and highly to be praised.” (Ps. 48:1.) This is said of the Son also, for it always calls Him Lord. “Thou art great, and doest wondrous things. Thou art God alone.” (Ps. 86:10.) And again, “Great is our Lord, and great is His power, and of His greatness there is no end.” (Ps. 145:3.) But the Son, he says, is little. But it is thou that sayest this, for the Scripture says the contrary: as of the Father, so it speaks of the Son; for listen to Paul, saying, “Looking for the blessed hope, and appearing of the glory of our great God.” (Tit. 2:13.) But can he have said “appearing” of the Father? Nay, that he may the more convince you, he has added with reference to the appearing “of the great God.” Is it then not said of the Father? By no means. For the sequel suffers it not which says, “The appearing of our great God and Saviour Jesus Christ.”9 See, the Son is great also. How then speakest thou of small and great? Listen to the Prophet too, calling him “The Messenger10 of great counsel.” (Isa. 9:6.) “The Messenger of great counsel,” is He not great Himself? “The mighty God,” is He small and not great? What mean then these shameless and reckless men when they say, that being little He is a God? I repeat ofttimes what they say, that ye may the more avoid them. He being a lesser God seized not for Himself to be like the greater God! Tell me now (but think not that these words are mine), if he were little, as they say, and far inferior to the Father in power, how could He possibly have seized to Himself equality with God? For an inferior nature could not seize for himself admission into that which is great; for example, a man could not seize on becoming equal to an angel in nature; a horse could not, though he wished it, seize on being equal to a man in nature. But besides all that, I will say this too. What does Paul wish to establish by this example? Surely, to lead the Philippians to humility. To what purpose then did he bring forward this example? For no one who would exhort to humility speaks thus; “Be thou humble, and think less of thyself than of thine equals in honor, for such an one who is a slave has not risen against his master; do thou imitate him.” 6 Euseb. vii. 27–30. 7 See St. Ath. Disc. i. c. xi. § 4. [For the various heretics here mentioned, see in Smith’s Dict. Christian Biog., or in the Schaff-Herzog Encyc. of Religious Knowledge.—J. A. B.] 8 [Rev. Ver. “a prize,” a thing seized, or a thing to be seized.—J. A. B.] 9 [Chrys.’s whole argument shows that he understands this passage as here translated, after Rev. Ver. Comp. Ellicott on Titus.—J. A. B.] 10 See also Jer. 32:18. Some copies of LXX. omit the latter part of Isa. 9:6, probably because it was not understood." John Chrysostom. “Homilies of St. John Chrysostom, Archbishop of Constantinople, on the Epistle of St. Paul the Apostle to the Philippians.” Saint Chrysostom: Homilies on Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, Thessalonians, Timothy, Titus, and Philemon. Ed. Philip Schaff. Trans. W. C. Cotton and John Albert Broadus. Vol. 13. New York: Christian Literature Company, 1889. 207–208. Print. A Select Library Statement: "Your image is a hypostasis of you, but without life." Response: I do not believe that reflects the Orthodox definition of hypostasis. The attached article in factbook on hypostasis notes the word "real" "In Greek, hupostasis signifies “essence” or “substance.” It comes from a word meaning “to subsist,” literally “to stand under,” and therefore denotes a real, personal subsistence. Philosophically, hypostasis emphasized essence as distinct from attributes. Theologically, it was used and continues to be used by orthodox trinitarians as a term to describe any one of the three real and distinct personal subsistences of the one undivided divine essence. That is its meaning in Heb. 1:3. The formula, “One essence (Greek, ousia) three subsistences (hupostasis)” is the accepted trinitarian statement of the biblical doctrine of God’s tri-unity" Cairns, Alan. Dictionary of Theological Terms 2002 : 218. Print. I rather like the New Dictionary of Theology: Historical and Systematic Definition. It's awesome when I find treasures in my library I did not know I had. "Hypostasis is a Greek noun (plural hypostaseis) which became the standard designation in Eastern theology of a ‘person’ of the divine Trinity. Its nearest Latin equivalent was persona. Hypostasis had a wide range of non-technical meanings (cf. its NT occurrences in 2 Cor. 9:4; 11:17; Heb. 1:3; 3:14; 11:1), but in philosophy and theology it denoted ‘being, substantial reality’, with reference either to the stuff or substance of which a thing consisted (cf. Heb. 1:3) or to its particularity. Against *Monarchianism, *Origen insisted that Father, Son and Spirit were eternally distinct hypostaseis. Until the later fourth century (e.g. in the Creed of Nicaea of 325), hypostasis was used almost interchangeably with ousia (see *Substance), but *Basil and his fellow-Cappadocians vindicated its appropriateness to designate the three objective presentations of God, while restricting ousia to the single Godhead. This differentiation broadly corresponded to Latin theology’s one substantia and three personae—which bred confusion, since substantia was the etymological equivalent of hypostasis, not of ousia. The difference between hypostasis and ousia is subtle, for both speak of single entities or beings. Ousia has more reference to internal essence or nature (God in respect of his God-ness), while hypostasis more to the objective, concrete individuality of the three ‘persons’ (to which a closer Lat. counterpart would be subsistentia). In *Christology, the Council of *Chalcedon (451) distinguished between the one hypostasis of Christ’s incarnate being and the two physeis, ‘natures’ (divine and human), which were united in what *Alexandrian theologians called ‘the hypostatic union’. (They had earlier used physis almost in the sense of hypostasis, for the single being of Christ.) After Chalcedon, debate continued on the integrity of Christ’s human nature—whether it lacked a personal centre or focus and was strictly ‘non-personal’ (anhypostatos), as theologians in the mould of *Cyril of Alexandria taught. (Some *Antiochene divines liked to ascribe a hypostasis to the human nature.) The one hypostasis affirmed by Chalcedon was normally interpreted as that of the divine Word. A resolution of the difficulty was provided by Leontius of Byzantium (d. c. 543), whose life remains obscure, although he was probably a Palestinian monk who spent several years at Constantinople. He wrote against both *Nestorians and *Monophysites, using *Aristotelian categories in a new way in the service of Christological definition. According to the traditional interpretation, his basically Cyrilline teaching declared that Christ’s humanity, although anhypostatos, was enhypostatos, ‘in-personal, intrahypostatic’, i.e. had its personal subsistence in the person of the Logos, while still preserving, as Chalcedon affirmed, its own characteristic properties. God incarnate thus encompassed within himself the perfection of human nature. This notion of enhypostasia (a form not found until much later; enhypostatos had earlier been used by Neoplatonists) was developed by *Maximus the Confessor and *John of Damascus. A recent reinterpretation by D. B. Evans (Leontius of Byzantium: An Origenist Christology, Washington, 1970) claims that for Leontius both divine and human natures were enhypostatized, in the hypostasis of Jesus Christ which was not that of the Logos. This view (which makes him an Origenist in Christology, indebted to Evagrius Ponticus [346–99], a pioneer writer on monastic spirituality) has found some acceptance (e.g. J. Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, New York, 21975) but much resistance (e.g. J. J. Lynch in TS 36, 1975, pp. 455–471, and B. Daley in JTS n.s. 27, 1976, pp. 333–369)." Wright, D. F. “Hypostasis.” Ed. Martin Davie et al. New Dictionary of Theology: Historical and Systematic 2016 : 433–434. Print. Statement: "Jesus did not have white hair, the Ancient of Days did, Jesus was not usually associated with the first and last title, that was usually of Yahweh, etc. So this one "person" John saw, was none other than the New Temple of God (Jesus) with the fullness of Deity dwelling there bodily (the Father). " Response: I believe many times Jesus has the titles that are given to God. For example the Jews picked up stones to stone Jesus for Him claiming He was the great I AM. The titles that Jesus is called by were meant to point to His deity. Certainly the essence of the Father is the essence of Jesus. As long as you are holding to the fact that Jesus is not the Father nor the Spirit but has the same essence which is His Godhood, I believe you are holding to a trinitarian perspective. Where things start to change is when we start talking about mixing. There are no scriptures that refer to mixing. Dwelling itself is not mixing.
    4. Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae

      "QUESTION 29


      THE DIVINE PERSONS



      Having premised what have appeared necessary notions concerning the processions and the relations, we must now approach the subject of the persons. 

      First, we shall consider the persons absolutely, and then comparatively as regards each other. 

      We must consider the persons absolutely first in common; and then singly. 

      The general consideration of the persons seemingly involves four points: (1) The signification of this word person; (2) the number of the persons; (3) what is involved in the number of persons, or is opposed thereto; as diversity, and similitude, and the like; and (4) what belongs to our knowledge of the persons. 

      Four subjects of inquiry are comprised in the first point: 


         (1)   The definition of person. 

         (2)   The comparison of person to essence, subsistence, and hypostasis. 

         (3)   Whether the name of person is becoming to God? 

         (4)   What does it signify in Him? 



      Article 1


      Whether Boethius’ definition of a person is unfitting: “a person is an individual substance of a rational nature”?


      OBJECTION 1: It would seem that the definition of person given by Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) is insufficient—that is, a person is an individual substance of a rational nature. For nothing singular can be subject to definition. But person signifies something singular. Therefore person is improperly defined. 

      OBJ. 2: Further, substance as placed above in the definition of person, is either first substance, or second substance. If it is the former, the word individual is superfluous, because first substance is individual substance; if it stands for second substance, the word individual is false, for there is contradiction of terms; since second substances are the genera or species. Therefore this definition is incorrect. 

      OBJ. 3: Further, an intentional term must not be included in the definition of a thing. For to define a man as a species of animal would not be a correct definition; since man is the name of a thing, and species is a name of an intention. Therefore, since person is the name of a thing (for it signifies a substance of a rational nature), the word individual which is an intentional name comes improperly into the definition. 

      OBJ. 4: Further, Nature is the principle of motion and rest, in those things in which it is essentially, and not accidentally, as Aristotle says (Phys. ii). But person exists in things immovable, as in God, and in the angels. Therefore the word nature ought not to enter into the definition of person, but the word should rather be essence. 

      OBJ. 5: Further, the separated soul is an individual substance of the rational nature; but it is not a person. Therefore person is not properly defined as above. 

      I ANSWER THAT, Although the universal and particular exist in every genus, nevertheless, in a certain special way, the individual belongs to the genus of substance. For substance is individualized by itself; whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject, which is the substance; since this particular whiteness is called this, because it exists in this particular subject. And so it is reasonable that the individuals of the genus substance should have a special name of their own; for they are called hypostases, or first substances. 

      Further still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and the individual are found in the rational substances which have dominion over their own actions; and which are not only made to act, like others; but which can act of themselves; for actions belong to singulars. Therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have a special name even among other substances; and this name is person. 

      Thus the term individual substance is placed in the definition of person, as signifying the singular in the genus of substance; and the term rational nature is added, as signifying the singular in rational substances. 

      REPLY OBJ. 1: Although this or that singular may not be definable, yet what belongs to the general idea of singularity can be defined; and so the Philosopher (De Praedic., cap. De substantia) gives a definition of first substance; and in this way Boethius defines person. 

      REPLY OBJ. 2: In the opinion of some, the term substance in the definition of person stands for first substance, which is the hypostasis; nor is the term individual superfluously added, forasmuch as by the name of hypostasis or first substance the idea of universality and of part is excluded. For we do not say that man in general is an hypostasis, nor that the hand is since it is only a part. But where individual is added, the idea of assumptibility is excluded from person; for the human nature in Christ is not a person, since it is assumed by a greater—that is, by the Word of God. 

      It is, however, better to say that substance is here taken in a general sense, as divided into first and second, and when individual is added, it is restricted to first substance. 

      REPLY OBJ. 3: Substantial differences being unknown to us, or at least unnamed by us, it is sometimes necessary to use accidental differences in the place of substantial; as, for example, we may say that fire is a simple, hot, and dry body: for proper accidents are the effects of substantial forms, and make them known. Likewise, terms expressive of intention can be used in defining realities if used to signify things which are unnamed. And so the term individual is placed in the definition of person to signify the mode of subsistence which belongs to particular substances. 

      REPLY OBJ. 4: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 5), the word nature was first used to signify the generation of living things, which is called nativity. And because this kind of generation comes from an intrinsic principle, this term is extended to signify the intrinsic principle of any kind of movement. In this sense he defines nature (Phys. ii, 3). And since this kind of principle is either formal or material, both matter and form are commonly called nature. And as the essence of anything is completed by the form; so the essence of anything, signified by the definition, is commonly called nature. And here nature is taken in that sense. Hence Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that, nature is the specific difference giving its form to each thing, for the specific difference completes the definition, and is derived from the special form of a thing. So in the definition of person, which means the singular in a determined genus, it is more correct to use the term nature than essence, because the latter is taken from being, which is most common. 

      REPLY OBJ. 5: The soul is a part of the human species; and so, although it may exist in a separate state, yet since it ever retains its nature of unibility, it cannot be called an individual substance, which is the hypostasis or first substance, as neither can the hand nor any other part of man; thus neither the definition nor the name of person belongs to it. 



      Article 2


      Whether ‘person’ is the same as hypostasis, subsistence, and essence?


      OBJECTION 1: It would seem that person is the same as hypostasis, subsistence, and essence. For Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that the Greeks called the individual substance of the rational nature by the name hypostasis. But this with us signifies person. Therefore person is altogether the same as hypostasis. 

      OBJ. 2: Further, as we say there are three persons in God, so we say there are three subsistences in God; which implies that person and subsistence have the same meaning. Therefore person and subsistence mean the same. 

      OBJ. 3: Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed.) that the Greek ousia, which means essence, signifies a being composed of matter and form. Now that which is composed of matter and form is the individual substance called hypostasis and person. Therefore all the aforesaid names seem to have the same meaning. 

      OBJ. 4: On the contrary, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that genera and species only subsist; whereas individuals are not only subsistent, but also substand. But subsistences are so called from subsisting, as substance or hypostasis is so called from substanding. Therefore, since genera and species are not hypostases or persons, these are not the same as subsistences. 

      OBJ. 5: Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed.) that matter is called hypostasis, and form is called ousiosis—that is, subsistence. But neither form nor matter can be called person. Therefore person differs from the others. 

      I ANSWER THAT, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), substance is twofold. In one sense it means the quiddity of a thing, signified by its definition, and thus we say that the definition means the substance of a thing; in which sense substance is called by the Greeks ousia, what we may call essence. In another sense substance means a subject or suppositum, which subsists in the genus of substance. To this, taken in a general sense, can be applied a name expressive of an intention; and thus it is called suppositum. 

      It is also called by three names signifying a reality—that is, a thing of nature, subsistence, and hypostasis, according to a threefold consideration of the substance thus named. For, as it exists in itself and not in another, it is called subsistence; as we say that those things subsist which exist in themselves, and not in another. As it underlies some common nature, it is called a thing of nature; as, for instance, this particular man is a human natural thing. As it underlies the accidents, it is called hypostasis, or substance. What these three names signify in common to the whole genus of substances, this name person signifies in the genus of rational substances. 

      REPLY OBJ. 1: Among the Greeks the term hypostasis, taken in the strict interpretation of the word, signifies any individual of the genus substance; but in the usual way of speaking, it means the individual of the rational nature, by reason of the excellence of that nature. 

      REPLY OBJ. 2: As we say three persons plurally in God, and three subsistences, so the Greeks say three hypostases. But because the word substance, which, properly speaking, corresponds in meaning to hypostasis, is used among us in an equivocal sense, since it sometimes means essence, and sometimes means hypostasis, in order to avoid any occasion of error, it was thought preferable to use subsistence for hypostasis, rather than substance. 

      REPLY OBJ. 3: Strictly speaking, the essence is what is expressed by the definition. Now, the definition comprises the principles of the species, but not the individual principles. Hence in things composed of matter and form, the essence signifies not only the form, nor only the matter, but what is composed of matter and the common form, as the principles of the species. But what is composed of this matter and this form has the nature of hypostasis and person. For soul, flesh, and bone belong to the nature of man; whereas this soul, this flesh and this bone belong to the nature of this man. Therefore hypostasis and person add the individual principles to the idea of essence; nor are these identified with the essence in things composed of matter and form, as we said above when treating of divine simplicity (Q. 3, A. 3). 

      REPLY OBJ. 4: Boethius says that genera and species subsist, inasmuch as it belongs to some individual things to subsist, from the fact that they belong to genera and species comprised in the predicament of substance, but not because the species and genera themselves subsist; except in the opinion of Plato, who asserted that the species of things subsisted separately from singular things. To substand, however, belongs to the same individual things in relation to the accidents, which are outside the essence of genera and species. 

      REPLY OBJ. 5: The individual composed of matter and form substands in relation to accident from the very nature of matter. Hence Boethius says (De Trin.): A simple form cannot be a subject. Its self-subsistence is derived from the nature of its form, which does not supervene to the things subsisting, but gives actual existence to the matter and makes it subsist as an individual. On this account, therefore, he ascribes hypostasis to matter, and ousiosis, or subsistence, to the form, because the matter is the principle of substanding, and form is the principle of subsisting. 



      Article 3


      Whether the word ‘person’ should be said of God?


      OBJECTION 1: It would seem that the name person should not be said of God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.): No one should ever dare to say or think anything of the supersubstantial and hidden Divinity, beyond what has been divinely expressed to us by the oracles. But the name person is not expressed to us in the Old or New Testament. Therefore person is not to be applied to God. 

      OBJ. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.): The word person seems to be taken from those persons who represented men in comedies and tragedies. For person comes from sounding through, since a greater volume of sound is produced through the cavity in the mask. These persons or masks the Greeks called prosopa, as they were placed on the face and covered the features before the eyes. This, however, can apply to God only in a metaphorical sense. Therefore the word person is only applied to God metaphorically. 

      OBJ. 3: Further, every person is a hypostasis. But the word hypostasis does not apply to God, since, as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.), it signifies what is the subject of accidents, which do not exist in God. Jerome also says (Ep. ad Damas.) that, in this word hypostasis, poison lurks in honey. Therefore the word person should not be said of God. 

      OBJ. 4: Further, if a definition is denied of anything, the thing defined is also denied of it. But the definition of person, as given above, does not apply to God. Both because reason implies a discursive knowledge, which does not apply to God, as we proved above (Q. 14, A. 12); and thus God cannot be said to have a rational nature. And also because God cannot be called an individual substance, since the principle of individuation is matter; while God is immaterial: nor is He the subject of accidents, so as to be called a substance. Therefore the word person ought not to be attributed to God. 

      ON THE CONTRARY, In the Creed of Athanasius we say: One is the person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Spirit. 

      I ANSWER THAT, Person signifies what is most perfect in all nature—that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature. Hence, since everything that is perfect must be attributed to God, forasmuch as His essence contains every perfection, this name person is fittingly applied to God; not, however, as it is applied to creatures, but in a more excellent way; as other names also, which, while giving them to creatures, we attribute to God; as we showed above when treating of the names of God (Q. 13, A. 2). 

      REPLY OBJ. 1: Although the word person is not found applied to God in Scripture, either in the Old or New Testament, nevertheless what the word signifies is found to be affirmed of God in many places of Scripture; as that He is the supreme self-subsisting being, and the most perfectly intelligent being. If we could speak of God only in the very terms themselves of Scripture, it would follow that no one could speak about God in any but the original language of the Old or New Testament. The urgency of confuting heretics made it necessary to find new words to express the ancient faith about God. Nor is such a kind of novelty to be shunned; since it is by no means profane, for it does not lead us astray from the sense of Scripture. The Apostle warns us to avoid profane novelties of words (1 Tim 6:20). 

      REPLY OBJ. 2: Although this name person may not belong to God as regards the origin of the term, nevertheless it excellently belongs to God in its objective meaning. For as famous men were represented in comedies and tragedies, the name person was given to signify those who held high dignity. Hence, those who held high rank in the Church came to be called persons. Thence by some the definition of person is given as hypostasis distinct by reason of dignity. And because subsistence in a rational nature is of high dignity, therefore every individual of the rational nature is called a person. Now the dignity of the divine nature excels every other dignity; and thus the name person pre-eminently belongs to God. 

      REPLY OBJ. 3: The word hypostasis does not apply to God as regards its source of origin, since He does not underlie accidents; but it applies to Him in its objective sense, for it is imposed to signify the subsistence. Jerome said that poison lurks in this word, forasmuch as before it was fully understood by the Latins, the heretics used this term to deceive the simple, to make people profess many essences as they profess several hypostases, inasmuch as the word substance, which corresponds to hypostasis in Greek, is commonly taken among us to mean essence. 

      REPLY OBJ. 4: It may be said that God has a rational nature, if reason be taken to mean, not discursive thought, but in a general sense, an intelligent nature. But God cannot be called an individual in the sense that His individuality comes from matter; but only in the sense which implies incommunicability. Substance can be applied to God in the sense of signifying self-subsistence. There are some, however, who say that the definition of Boethius, quoted above (A. 1), is not a definition of person in the sense we use when speaking of persons in God. Therefore Richard of St. Victor amends this definition by adding that Person in God is the incommunicable existence of the divine nature. 



      Article 4


      Whether this word ‘person’ signifies relation?


      OBJECTION 1: It would seem that this word person, as applied to God, does not signify relation, but substance. For Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6): When we speak of the person of the Father, we mean nothing else but the substance of the Father, for person is said in regard to Himself, and not in regard to the Son. 

      OBJ. 2: Further, the interrogation What? refers to essence. But, as Augustine says: When we say there are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, and it is asked, Three what? the answer is, Three persons. Therefore person signifies essence. 

      OBJ. 3: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv), the meaning of a word is its definition. But the definition of person is this: The individual substance of the rational nature, as above stated. Therefore person signifies substance. 

      OBJ. 4: Further, person in men and angels does not signify relation, but something absolute. Therefore, if in God it signified relation, it would bear an equivocal meaning in God, in man, and in angels. 

      ON THE CONTRARY, Boethius says (De Trin.) that every word that refers to the persons signifies relation. But no word belongs to person more strictly than the very word person itself. Therefore this word person signifies relation. 

      I ANSWER THAT, A difficulty arises concerning the meaning of this word person in God, from the fact that it is predicated plurally of the Three in contrast to the nature of the names belonging to the essence; nor does it in itself refer to another, as do the words which express relation. 

      Hence some have thought that this word person of itself expresses absolutely the divine essence; as this name God and this word Wise; but that to meet heretical attack, it was ordained by conciliar decree that it was to be taken in a relative sense, and especially in the plural, or with the addition of a distinguishing adjective; as when we say, Three persons, or, one is the person of the Father, another of the Son, etc. Used, however, in the singular, it may be either absolute or relative. But this does not seem to be a satisfactory explanation; for, if this word person, by force of its own signification, expresses the divine essence only, it follows that forasmuch as we speak of three persons, so far from the heretics being silenced, they had still more reason to argue. 

      Seeing this, others maintained that this word person in God signifies both the essence and the relation. Some of these said that it signifies directly the essence, and relation indirectly, forasmuch as person means as it were by itself one; and unity belongs to the essence. And what is by itself implies relation indirectly; for the Father is understood to exist by Himself, as relatively distinct from the Son. Others, however, said, on the contrary, that it signifies relation directly; and essence indirectly; forasmuch as in the definition of person the term nature is mentioned indirectly; and these come nearer to the truth. 

      To determine the question, we must consider that something may be included in the meaning of a less common term, which is not included in the more common term; as rational is included in the meaning of man, and not in the meaning of animal. So that it is one thing to ask the meaning of the word animal, and another to ask its meaning when the animal in question is man. Also, it is one thing to ask the meaning of this word person in general; and another to ask the meaning of person as applied to God. For person in general signifies the individual substance of a rational figure. The individual in itself is undivided, but is distinct from others. Therefore person in any nature signifies what is distinct in that nature: thus in human nature it signifies this flesh, these bones, and this soul, which are the individuating principles of a man, and which, though not belonging to person in general, nevertheless do belong to the meaning of a particular human person. 

      Now distinction in God is only by relation of origin, as stated above (Q. 28, AA. 2, 3), while relation in God is not as an accident in a subject, but is the divine essence itself; and so it is subsistent, for the divine essence subsists. Therefore, as the Godhead is God so the divine paternity is God the Father, Who is a divine person. Therefore a divine person signifies a relation as subsisting. And this is to signify relation by way of substance, and such a relation is a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature, although in truth that which subsists in the divine nature is the divine nature itself. 

      Thus it is true to say that the name person signifies relation directly, and the essence indirectly; not, however, the relation as such, but as expressed by way of a hypostasis. So likewise it signifies directly the essence, and indirectly the relation, inasmuch as the essence is the same as the hypostasis: while in God the hypostasis is expressed as distinct by the relation: and thus relation, as such, enters into the notion of the person indirectly. Thus we can say that this signification of the word person was not clearly perceived before it was attacked by heretics. Hence, this word person was used just as any other absolute term. But afterwards it was applied to express relation, as it lent itself to that signification, so that this word person means relation not only by use and custom, according to the first opinion, but also by force of its own proper signification. 

      REPLY OBJ. 1: This word person is said in respect to itself, not to another; forasmuch as it signifies relation not as such, but by way of a substance—which is a hypostasis. In that sense Augustine says that it signifies the essence, inasmuch as in God essence is the same as the hypostasis, because in God what He is, and whereby He is are the same. 

      REPLY OBJ. 2: The term what refers sometimes to the nature expressed by the definition, as when we ask, What is man? and we answer: A mortal rational animal. Sometimes it refers to the suppositum, as when we ask, What swims in the sea? and answer, A fish. So to those who ask, Three what? we answer, Three persons. 

      REPLY OBJ. 3: In God, the individual—i.e., distinct and incommunicable substance—includes the idea of relation, as above explained. 

      REPLY OBJ. 4: The different sense of the less common term does not produce equivocation in the more common. Although a horse and an ass have their own proper definitions, nevertheless they agree univocally in animal, because the common definition of animal applies to both. So it does not follow that, although relation is contained in the signification of divine person, but not in that of an angelic or of a human person, the word person is used in an equivocal sense. Though neither is it applied univocally, since nothing can be said univocally of God and creatures (Q. 13, A. 5)."



      Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae. Ed. The Aquinas Institute. Trans. Laurence Shapcote. Vol. 13. Green Bay, WI; Steubenville, OH: Aquinas Institute; Emmaus Academic, 2018. Print.

      1. I*m not sure about "private" - it seems the faithlife community can't be browsed without an account anyway (logged out and tried) and depending on the group settings, maybe only members or followers can see the posts above.
      2. Hamilton.. with copyright there is a 10% fair use rule. This is not even close to 10% of summa. It’s a huge work
    5. Trinitarianism, in contrast to Unitarianism... seems like they are opposites of a continuum. Even though at times it would seem that the two have irreconcilable differences, I wonder if there is a more of in the middle alternative. The reason being is that when we take in consideration some of the standards needed to validate a theological construct (see added media), both fall short by when looked by themselves. The main concern I have comes from noting in the Bible certain verses: Leb: Zechariah 14:9 And Yahweh will be king over all the earth; on that day Yahweh will be one and his name one. Rev 7:17  because the Lamb who is in the midst of the throne will shepherd them and will lead them to springs of living waters, and God will wipe away every tear from their eyes." Like I wrote somewhere else long ago: So if the Lamb is in the midst then is implied that the Father (Creator of Heaven and Earth) is a little to the left so the Lamb can be to His right? unlikely. We have a wonderful description of a Being in Revelation 1:12 - 19, many of the descriptive details are exactly related to Yahweh in the OT, but some other characteristics seem to be related with Jesus Christ, the Son of Man. Could it be that in the end, God fleshed Himself of humanity to be able to be with us without causing us harm as He would if present among us in Spirit? The description in Rev 1, seems to be a combination of the Ancient of Days and the Son of Man. Ireneaus at one point seemed to think that "Jesus and the Holy Spirit are like the arms (or hands) of God that He uses to bring believers close to His heart" [very rough paraphrase from flawed memory of mine] If that is so, note that members (arms or hands), of the Godhead, are not different persons, but inherent elements. So maybe there is something about the unity of God that escapes our understanding precisely because we have a particular contextual situation that does not allow us to know about other forms (or modes) of being. So looking in awesome Logos Software, I found something that can be the start of an exploration into a more in the middle of the continuum possibility: One may hold, with orthodox theologians from Basil of Caesarea to Herman Bavinck, either that the divine persons are modes of the divine being or that they differ only in their modes of being, without committing oneself to the heresy of modalism. In order to avoid modalism, rather, one need merely affirm that the distinctions between the divine persons are (1) eternal, (2) unchangeable, and (3) real, and in particular, intrinsic to the divine being and not dependent for their existence on the activity of nondivine minds.  Jowers, D. W. (2018). Modalism. In H. W. House (Ed.), The Evangelical Dictionary of World Religions (p. 327). Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books: A Division of Baker Publishing Group. Peace and grace. Not perfect, but also a good start to look at the issue with fresh perspective.
      1. Blair: Better information is coming up: 10.6 Jesus and the Spirit Dunn, J. D. G. (2006). The Partings of the Ways: Between Christianity and Judaism and Their Significance for the Character of Christianity (Second Edition). London: SCM Press. The previous section was up to something good, but then blew it with associating Colossians with poetry. Jesus as God's Wisdom made flesh... Living Torah anyone... Then when explain about the relation of Jesus with the H.S. is clear that the Holy Spirit is the giver of life, the one that operates to resuscitate humans, so the construct that He must have left Jesus before Jesus died, is plausible, otherwise Jesus would not be able to die. I also noted that there is a Factbook entry for hypostasis. Pretty cool. Lastly my unscientific way to research more was to select certain resources from the filter in Library: 1 New Temple of God 2 Temple I put selected resources picked from the above and placed in a collection, then looked up the term hypostasis (that is how I got to the Parting of the ways book). Lots of material to check. Then one must prioritize selected key concepts, to then have a more rational way to study the subject. Wonder if there is somewhere a section dealing with the relation between God the Father and the Holy Spirit.
      2.  — Edited

        Oops... more problems: Furthermore, there are for Barth, as for Calvin, soteriological reasons why the creaturely integrity of the Temple is upheld. It is crucial to Jesus Christ’s work as mediator that the dwelling place remains human: ‘If the human essence of Jesus Christ is deified, can he really be the Mediator between God and us?’ (IV/2, p. 89). His human essence is the same as ours, and even as the exalted Son of Man, he is still our brother, and in this way accessible and recognizable and able to be the first-born among many brothers.  Norgate, J. (2004). The Temple in the Theology of Karl Barth. In T. D. Alexander & S. Gathercole (Eds.), Heaven on Earth (p. 234). Carlisle [England: Paternoster Press. In theory, Mary was not a contributor to the zygote of Jesus, because she was of a fallen nature, and the Lamb had to be perfect. Even more, if Jesus had some fallen nature on Him, the Holy Spirit would not be able to remain on Him after descending because that Holy Spirit presence would kill any fallen nature not yet justified by the atonement. Now Jesus as an incarnated Divine Hypostasis (more similar to the nature of Adam before the fall [to allow equality of conditions for testing]), so as being of unfallen nature, could perfectly receive the Holy Spirit and have that Holy Spirit remain. And this is the beauty of it: an unfallen human, dying voluntarily for the fallen ones... Wisdom and Power of God at best, so that obedience was learned by making Himself similar to us, and letting go of being same as God, so that He could die for us. To then be glorified and have the fullness of Deity dwell bodily being the New Temple of God. By extension, as we are the body of Christ, we become living stones, part of that Temple, but that does not make us same as the Spirit that indwells the temple. Being a living stone part of the New Temple of God, does not give us self-existence. That is an incommunicable attribute of God. We will always be dependent on God's grace to continue living even in glorified form.
      3. Blair posted way above in the thread: "Concerning St. Irenaeus, Trinitarians see that picture as a picture of the Trinity. We believe the Spirit and the Christ are both the same God.  "St. Irenaeus drew a beautiful picture of God the Father holding His two hands out to us. The one hand is the Holy Spirit. The other hand is Jesus. Thus we have the Trinity " by Anthony M. Coniaris. Knowing God: Life’s Highest Purpose and Joy. N. p. Print. This is precisely my point, arms, or hands extended out by God are not different persons, but different hypostasis of God. Arms or hands are considered inherent members of 1 Being, and that seems to be what the view was in that era believer's worldview. I have to accept that because that seems to be the intent of the Authors concerning Jesus (not two powers on heaven, but an inherent Hypostasis of God). The next investigation is to find out if "seated to the right " is figurative language, and what they meant by it. As I have mentioned elsewhere: is God (the Creator of all) a little to the left so the Lamb can be to the right? (unlikely). Rev 7:17  because the Lamb who is in the midst of the thronewill shepherd them and will lead them to springs of living waters, and God will wipe away every tear from their eyes." So being to the right seems to me more like figurative language to indicate that resurrected Jesus (New Temple of God) is where the fullness of Deity dwells bodily.
    6. Welcome, Hamilton Ramos. I look forward to our discussion on modalism
      1. Yes, sorry Blair I did not see this, you beat me to the punch. I did post something for your consideration.
      2. By request: https://apostolicacademics.com/2016/03/02/response-to-dr-james-white/ https://www.onenesspentecostal.com Some oneness believers seem to have some interesting arguments that are worthy of study. I am not so sophisticated as to understand deeply some of the issues. I do see that the term person does not seem to be appropriate when talking about Hypostases.
    7. Raffaele Paglialunga writes: "I don't know what is happening where everyone else is at but from what I have been reading from all sorts of Christian authors, from all different walks of life, I am noticing a growing shift in the Gospel presentation. I love learning by means of reading, as well as listening to different views, especially Christian conferences (T4G, G3, GospelColtion, ShepCon, etc). With that said, I am deeply broken in spirit by what I am seeing take place in the Christian world. I have often wondered where all this new nonsense came from and now I believe I know. This craziness of the Social Gospel comes from the Communist handbook and is eagerly promoted by American Christians who claim to be doing the Lord's work with an unfortunate clouded view of the Gospel itself. What is real troublesome is many very well known and deeply educated men whom I consider brethren are involved in this effort to Christianize the Social Gospel movement. Besides the Social Gospel movement there are many who also are pushing to get revival started in America (as the Third Great Awakening) and yet if we only read the Word of God, we'll discover that first, revivals are for Saints but more importantly, it isn't likely to happen because the world (people) are moving away from having anything to do with God. The World is blind to the Light of this world. It is the reason why the Gospel message must be proclaimed in full with nothing left out. Even when preachers proclaim to their flock the message weekly, they do so with the intent of rebuking, reproving, and edifying. Unless an unbeliever hears the message preached, unless they are pricked in their heart, unless God gives them a heart of stone to receive, they will NEVER believe. People are evil, corrupt, and look for more ways to be evil and do evil. Even the very words of Christ are, "the way is straight and narrow, FEW find it..." The way to hell is of course opposite "wide, and broad MANY enter through its gate". It's about time we stop fooling around with nonsense and get back to Preaching the Word of the Living God. Time is short and tomorrow we are not guaranteed." Denise suggested: "Well, at least I was intro'd to a historical movement (Logos resource, almost): https://www.christianitytoday.com/history/people/activists/walter-rauschenbusch.html And Logos even has his collection too. https://www.logos.com/product/28531/the-walter-rauschenbusch-collection My guess, the OP may have had something else in mind, but interesting author." James McAdams and Lew Worthington found Raffaele's comments painful and unpleasant. Discuss amongst yourselves...
      1. SineNomine, Thanks for pointing that out. I did a ctrl+f to see if I missed but somehow I must have missed it even after that!
      2. James McAdams, I like that idea. I find that when it gets down to disagreement it's better to discuss particulars and specifics rather than the sort theory-building that is common on this issue. That theory-building or narrative construction happens on both the social justice side and the anti-SJ side.
      3. Interesting post J. Remington. Not an expert so take me lightly. J. Remington wrote: "People are evil, corrupt, and look for more ways to be evil and do evil." I am not sure about the above quote. Assuming you are Evangelical and Protestant, I would look in the Bible to see what it shows / says. Magdalene was a normal citizen / person so to speak, yet, before she could be discipled, 7 spirits (unclean, impure, etc) had to be driven out. Modern Christian thinkers tend to associate possession with mental health states, yet as an insightful observed noted: "mental health states do not make pigs run and jump off a cliff". So are most persons evil, or are they somehow influenced by spiritual enemies of God? What else does the Bible show / teach? is the power of the Holy Spirit needed to sever such influences and allow the sheep to grow and mature so they can bear fruit within the gift that the Holy Spirit gives him / her? Social gospel, civic action gospel, hearts and hands for Christ, etc are not the problem, but what the root important issue is, is the indwelling, non-quenching, allow Him to lead relation with the Holy Spirit. When rationality, piety, and other things are put at the forefront, trying to take the place of the Paraklete (H.S), then most times unintended bad consequences result. Is not that God punishes, or does evil things, is that outside the protection of His Paraklete (H.S.), we are at mercy of predators physical, and spiritual. A preacher went to an aboriginal area where women went around without top. He started praying so the Holy Spirit would fall on the crowd. Lo an behold, as soon as that happened, the women were covering themselves. 1 minute with the Holy Spirit, and godliness started to grow. Same with the revivals in Scotland, preachers would pray, and commoners in the street would fall on their knees and start crying, God was showing up in the neighborhood for real (miracle worker) changing hearts and minds. Different angle for further research, reflection and constructive comment.
    8. has joined the group.
    9. has joined the group.